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BANISHED FOR MINOR CRIMES: THE 
AGGRAVATED FELONY PROVISION OF 
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 
ACT AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION 
MELISSA COOK* 
Abstract: The aggravated felony provision of the U.S. Immigration and 
Nationality Act was was originally intended to provide for the 
deportation of non-citizens convicted of very serious crimes. Over the 
last 15 years, however, the provision has been consistently expanded to 
include a plethora of minor crimes that are neither aggravated nor 
felonious. Moreover, Congress has categorically prohibited aggravated 
felons from applying for discretionary, equitable relief. This Note 
contends that the sweeping and indiscriminately applied aggravated 
felony provision violates an individual's universally recognized right to 
respect for family and private life. The Note concludes that to comply 
with international law and treaty obligations, Congress should follow the 
standards employed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
deportation cases. Under this approach, a court may overturn a 
deportation order when the relevant interests of the non-citizen 
outweigh those ofthe United States. 
The impact of deportation upon the life of an alien is often as great if not 
greater than the imposition of a criminal sentence. A deported alien may 
lose his family, his friends and his livelihood forever. Return to his native 
land may result in poverty, persecution or even death. l 
INTRODUCTION 
Xuan Wilson came to the United States with her mother and her 
stepfather, a U.S serviceman, when she was four years 01d.2 She is now 
thirty-two and has lived in this country for twenty-eight years.s In 1989 
she was convicted of writing a forged check for $19.83.4 Because of 
* Senior Articles Editor, BOS'lUN COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2002-2003). 
1 Bridgesv. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945). 
2 See Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets-Immigration Law's New 
AggravatedFelons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 589, 591 (1998). 
sId. 
4Id. 
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this minor infraction, Ms. Wilson will be deported to a country she 
has not seen for almost three decades and will be permanently barred 
from returning to the United States5 This situation is only one exam-
ple of the many severe consequences of current U.S. immigration 
law.6 
Under current law, a lawful permanent resident (LPR)7 of the 
United States can be banished from the country for an offense as mi-
nor as writing a bad check, shop-lifting, or misdemeanor battery.8 An 
individual like Xuan Wilson will be permanently banned from re-
entering the United States based solely on this type of offense.9 It 
makes no difference whether this person has just arrived in the coun-
try or has lived here most of her life. IO There will be no consideration 
of whether deportation will force her to leave her entire family and 
return to a country that she scarcely remembers. ll In fact, she may 
not even have the opportunity to contest the deportation or to ask a 
court to remedy the situation. I2 Finally, she could be punished for a 
minor offense even if it was committed years before these deportation 
laws were passed. III 
This Note will address the severe and unjust results of laws man-
dating deportation (now technically called "removal") 14 of immigrants 
5 Id; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (A) (ii) (2000) [hereinaf-
terINAJ. 
6 See generally Nancy Morawetz, Untkrstanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and 
the Limited Scope of Proposed &forms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936 (2000); Coonan, supra note 2; 
Bruce Robert Marley, Comment, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the &troactive 
Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent &sidents, 35 SAN DIEGO L. 
REv. 855, 861-62 (1998). 
7 INA § 1101 (a)(20). 
8 See Morawetz, supra note 6, at 1939; Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Non-
uniform Immigration Consequences of "Aggravated Felony· Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 
1699 (1999); Coonan, supra note 2, at 591. 
9 SeeINA§ 1182(a) (9)(A) (ii). 
10Id. § 1227(a)(2) (A) (iii); Marley, supra note 6, at 861-62. 
II See Coonan, supra note 2, at 591. 
12 See INA § 1182(c). This section, which allowed the Attorney General to issue discre-
tionary waivers of deportation, was repealed in 1996. See id; see also id. § 1252(a) (2) (C) 
(eliminating judicial review of removal orders for aggravated felons) . 
15 Seeid. § 1101 (a) (43). 
14 Marley, supra note 6, at 872. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act 
of 1996 changed this terminology. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRAJ. Before 1996, there were two 
different proceedings for aliens deemed inadmissible (forbidden entry) and aliens who 
were deportable (deported after entry)-exclusion proceedings and deportation proceed-
ings, respectively. Id. I1RIRA consolidated exclusion and deportation proceedings by creat-
ing "removal proceedings.· Id. However, some of the old language remains in that the 
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who have been convicted of crimes, regardless of the seriousness of 
the offense.15 In particular, the Note will consider the inequity ofim-
migration laws that treat lawful permanent residents who commit 
petty offenses in precisely the same manner as undocumented non-
citizens who commit grievous crimes upon entering the country.16 
Furthermore, this Note will question whether Congress's failure to 
weigh the seriousness of the crime against the effects of deportation 
violates a fundamental human right, as recognized by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and customary internationallaw.l7 
Part I outlines the history of the deportation of criminal non-
citizens, focusing on the "aggravated felony" category. IS Part II of the 
Note contends that deportation of certain individuals convicted of 
aggravated felonies violates a fundamental human right recognized by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention), namely the right to respect 
for private and family life under Article 8. 19 Part II will also consider 
the approach employed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
cases where criminal non-citizens raise Article 8 to contest deporta-
tion.20 Part III contends that the aggravated felony provision is incon-
sistent with principles of international law and international agree-
statute still distinguishes deportable aliens from inadmissable aliens and therefore, this 
Note employs the term "deport" and its derivatives. See INA §§ 1182, 1227a. 
15 See INA § 1101 (a) (43) (including crimes ranging from murder and drug trafficking 
to misdemeanor theft and passport defacement); Marley, supra note 6, at 874. 
16 See Marley, supra note 6, at 862. 
17 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 V.N.T.S. 222, 230 [hereinafter Convention]; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 
13, art. 17, 999 V.N.T.S. 171, G.A. res. 2200A(XXI), 21 V.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 52, 
V.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at hup::/ /www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ 
b3ccpr.htm. 
18 SeeiNA §§ 1101 (a) (43), 1227(a)(2) (A) (iii); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of 
American Immig;ration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1841-46 (1993) (discuss-
ing early American immigration restrictions). 
19 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230. 
20See Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 1184-89 
(2001) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Dalia v. France, App. Np. 26102/95,33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625,641-46 
(1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739,750-
53 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia v. France, App. No. 23078/93, 25 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 686, 704-08 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International 
Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthe-
sis, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 805, 807 (1990) (noting that the European Court of Human Rights 
and the European Commission on Human Rights have created the most developed body 
of human rights law). 
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ments and then, employing the reasoning of a recent case and tenets 
of international law, suggests an alternative approach.21 Finally, the 
Note concludes that to comply with international law, Congress must 
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to include a balancing 
test that weighs the relevant interests of the non-citizen and the gov-
ernment.22 
I. DEPORTATION OF CRIMINAL NON-CITIZENS AND '!HE AGGRAVATED 
FELONY PROVISION OF '!HE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
Deportation of criminal non-aliens has evolved from state laws 
created to ward off an influx of exiled foreign criminals in the late 
eighteenth century to a federal system that banishes individuals for a 
number of minor crimes. Since the creation of the aggravated felony 
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Congress has 
consistently expanded its reach to cover less serious crimes while si-
multaneously circumscribing discretionary relief.23 The hardship im-
posed on non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies, particularly 
lawful permanent residents, has inspired many critics to oppose these 
laws as unjust and unnecessarily harsh.24 
A. Deportation Regulations Based on Criminal Activity 
During America's first century as a nation, Congress did little to 
regulate immigration.25 The few federal immigration laws in existence 
primarily concerned naturalization and the protection of passengers 
on international voyages.26 Despite the common misperception of 
early Americans as welcoming to all immigrants, restrictions on immi-
gration were in fact imposed by the states.27 Not surprisingly, Eng-
land's long history of transporting convicts to the colonies inspired 
passionate protest by the colonists.28 This compelled the colonies to 
attempt to regulate criminal immigration as early as 1718, although 
21 See infra notes 265-310 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 311-324. 
28 See infra notes 44-198. 
2. See generaUy Morawetz, supra note 6; Coonan, supra note 2; Marley, supra note 6. 
25 EDWARD PRINCE HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTI>RY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 1798-1963, at 11-46 (1981). The Alien and Sedition Act Laws of 1798 did allow 
the President to expel any alien that he deemed dangerous. See id. at 14. This law was un-
popular, however, and expired after 2 years. See id. at 14-16. 
26 See id. at 11-46. 
27 Neuman, supra note 18, at 1833-34. 
28 See id. at 1841. 
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they were not successful until 1787.29 At that time, states began refus-
ing entry to criminals who were exiled from another country, and 
some states forbade entrance to any individual who had ever been 
convicted of a crime. 30 
The federal government, however, did not attempt to control the 
immigration of criminals until nearly a century later. Congress's first 
effort in 1875 was similar to the states' earliest immigration laws, ex-
cluding convicts who had been forced to emigrate from their native 
country to avoid a prison sentence.31 Congress also passed a law in 
1882 banning "idiots," "lunatics," convicts, and "persons likely to be-
come public charges" in response to states' complaints that indigent 
and unwanted immigrants were consuming tax revenues.32 In 1891 
Congress expanded the class of excludable criminal aliens to include 
those who had committed crimes involving "moral turpitude. "33 
Even though Congress had expanded its authority to exclude 
criminals, a 1908 bill proposed to deport non-citizens convicted of 
felonies after entering the United States initially failed.34 Opponents 
argued that such a bill would be applied unfairly, because the 
definition of a felony varied too widely from state to state and in-
cluded minor crimes in some states.35 It was not until 1917, nine years 
later, that proponents gained sufficient support to implement the 
country's first deportation policy.36 By 1938 the grounds for deporta-
tion included the commission of felonies and crimes involving moral 
turpitude if committed within five years of entry into the United 
States.37 
Throughout the early twentieth century, these criminal grounds 
for deportation remained largely unchanged.38 In 1952 Congress 
29 [d. at 1841-42. Before the Revolutionary war, colonial attempts at legislation were 
vetoed by the British government. [d. at 1841. 
go See id. at 1842. 
51 See id., supra note 18, at 1844. 
52 HUTCHINSON, supra note 25, at 79-80. 
55 [d. at 102. Committing a crime of moral turpitude remains a ground for exclusion, 
as well as for deportation, to this day. See INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (2) (A)(i) , 
1227(a) (2) (A) (i) (2000). The phrase "moral turpitude" has never been statutorily defined, 
but has been interpreted to refer to conduct that is "base, vile or depraved and contrary to 
the rules of morality." Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal Ali-
ens, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357,362 (1999). Crimes such as fraud, murder, and 
other intentional assaults are usually found to involve moral turpitude. [d. 
54 See HUTCHINSON, supra note 25, at 144. 
55 See id. 
56 See Neuman, supra note 18, at 1844. 
57 HUTCHINSON, supra note 25, at 148, 165, 231-32, 242. 
58 See id. at 451. 
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passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, which retained the same 
grounds for deportation, established deportation procedures, and 
outlined discretionary relief.39 Since Congress passed the INA, crime-
related grounds for deportation have expanded steadily.40 Currently, 
the criminal grounds for deportation include crimes of moral turpi-
tude committed within five years of entry; aggravated felonies; high 
speed flight from an immigration checkpoint; controlled substance 
convictions, drug abuse, or addiction; firearms offenses; crimes relat-
ing to espionage, sabotage, treason or sedition for which a five-year 
sentence may be imposed; and crimes of domestic violence, stalking, 
violation of a protection order, and child abuse.41 
Of these categories, the aggravated felony provision encompasses 
the widest range of crimes.42 The types of crimes that constitute an 
"aggravated felony" have expanded rapidly since the passage of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1988, resulting in severe consequences for 
non-citizens, particularly lawful permanent residents.43 
B. The Transformation of the Aggravated Felony Provision of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
One legal scholar, employing Dante's legendary categorization, 
asserts that aggravated felons populate the eighth ring of immigration 
hel1.44 The consequences for the commission of the offense are 
frighteningly harsh-deportation, mandatory detention, expedited 
removal, and an absence of discretionary relief, to name a few. These 
crimes, however, need neither be "felonies" nor "aggravated" in the 
commonly understood sense of the words.45 In fact, many misde-
meanors, including shoplifting and simple battery, are considered 
"aggravated felonies."46 This section summarizes the growth of this 
monstrously sweeping provision. 
59 Seeid. See generally, INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1229 (2000). 
40 See INA § 1227 (a) (2). 
41 See id. 
42 See id. §§ 1101 (a) (43), 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii). 
45 See Marley, supra note 6, at 859-60; RobertJames McWhirter, HellJust Got Hotter: The 
Rings of Immigration Hell and the Immigration Consequences to Aliens Convicted of Crimes Revis-
ited, 11 CEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 507, 515 (1997). 
44 See McWhirter, supra note 43, at 515. The only immigrants in a worse situation than 
aggravated felons are those that occupy the ninth ring of immigration hell. See id. at 519. 
The inhabitants of the ninth ring are immigrants that attempt to re-enter the country after 
deportation; they may face up to 20 years in jail before being deported again. See id. at 519. 
45 Morawetz, supra note 6, at 1939. 
46Id. 
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1. The Early Evolution of the Aggravated Felony Provision 
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA) introduced the "ag-
gravated felony" concept.47 The ADAA made commission of an aggra-
vated felony a deportable offense.48 By enacting the ADAA, Congress 
sought to prevent the manufacturing, distribution, and use of illegal 
drugS.49 Congress apparently believed that the provision was an inte-
gral part of controlling drug crimes.50 Debates in the House of Repre-
sentatives suggest a concern over the growing number of drugs and 
weapons crimes committed by immigrants, as well as a belief that fe-
lonious immigrants were evading deportation.51 
Under the ADAA, aggravated felonies were limited to serious 
crimes, such as murder and drug and weapons trafficking.52 An aggra-
vated felony committed any time after entry subjected non-citizens to 
deportation. 53 Furthermore, the ADAA barred aggravated felons from 
seeking re-admission into the United States for ten years.54 
The Act also instituted special deportation procedures for aggra-
vated felons.55 It requires the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) to complete deportation proceedings before the non-citizen 
finishes serving his criminal sentence for the aggravated felony con-
viction.56 If proceedings are not completed before that time, the At-
torney General is instructed to hold the individual in custody until 
deported. 57 
An expansion of the aggravated felony provision was buried in 
the Immigration Act of 1990.58 One small section of the Act 
47 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469 
(1988). 
48 [d. 
49 [d. 
50 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 1988 V.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4181. 
5\ See generally 133 CONGo REC. H8961-01 (1987). 
52 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7342. The ADAA defined an aggravated felony as "mur-
der, any drug trafficking crime, or any illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices 
(committed in the Vnites States), or any attempt or conspiracy to commit such an act." See 
id. 
5! INA, 8 V.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (i) (2000); Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7344 (a) (2). 
54 Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7349. 
55 See id. §§ 7343(2), 7347. 
56 [d. § 7347. 
57 [d. § 7343. The Act also created a presumption of deportability, which prevented the 
individual from requesting voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. [d. §§ 7343(b), 
7437. Additionally, the time period for appeal of an order of deportation was also changed 
from six months to sixty days. [d. §§ 7343(b), 7347(b), 7347(c). 
58 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 
(1990). 
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significantly altered the aggravated felony provision by expanding its 
coverage to include more crimes.59 The legislative history of the Im-
migration Act states that the provision's purpose was to broaden the 
list of "serious crimes. "60 These "serious crimes," however, included 
lesser drug crimes and crimes of violence51 for which the term of im-
prisonment was five years; these offenses are far less serious than the 
crimes denoted in the ADAA.52 The changes were also intended to 
tighten perceived loopholes in the ADAA that allowed individuals to 
"escap[e] justice or deportation," implement expedited deportation 
proceedings, and limit stays of deportation.53 President George Bush 
shed further light on the reasons for the changes in his signing state-
ment, writing: 
[The aggravated felony expansion] meets several objectives 
of my Administration's war on drugs and violent crime ... 
[by providing] for the expeditious deportation of aliens who, 
by their violent criminal acts, forfeit their right to remain in 
this country. These offenders, comprising nearly a quarter of 
our federal prison population, jeopardize the safety and well-
being of every American resident.54 
When Congress passed the Immigration Act in 1990, the number 
of undocumented non-citizens in prison was six times greater than 
ten years before, and most of these prisoners had been convicted of 
drug crimes.55 More than 80% of the undocumented individuals who 
59 See id. 
60 H.R. CONF. REp. No 101-955, at 132 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 
6797. 
61 A crime of violence is an "offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another" or one that 
"involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another 
may be used in the course of committing an offense." 18 U .S.C. § 16 (2000). 
62 See Immigration Act of 1990 § 501; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, § 7342,102 Stat. 4181, 4469 (1988). The new definition also expanded its reach over 
drug offenses by including any illicit trafficking in a controlled substance. See Immigration 
Act of 1990 § 501. The Tenth Circuit found that possession of a controlled substance 
alone, even if not for the purpose of distribution or sale, could constitute a "drug 
trafficking" crime and therefore, be considered an aggravated felony. See Marley, supra 
note 6, at 864 (explaining that the Tenth Circuit considers mere possession of narcotics a 
trafficking crime, because "trafficking" does not require an element of trade or exchange). 
6!1 See 136 CONGo REc. S17106--()1 (1990). 
64 Statement on Signing the hnmigration Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS 1717-18 (Nov. 29, 
1990). 
65 See Ronald J. Ostrow, Bush Proposal to Short-cut Deportations Sounds Alarm, SEATI1..E 
TIMES, May 16, 1990, at A5. 
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were imprisoned had been convicted of narcotics violations, com-
pared with approximately 50% of all federal prisoners.66 Given these 
statistics, supporters of the law cited concerns about increasing levels 
of crime committed by non-citizens.67 Furthermore, drug control 
officials argued that the large number of incarcerated criminal aliens 
had a "tremendously adverse" effect on the nation's criminal justice 
system, which was compounded by an "ineffectual deportation sys-
tern. "68 
A few critics, however, pointed to the Act's potentially harsh ef-
fects on lawful permanent residents (a group often ignored when 
lawmakers focus on undocumented non-citizens).69 LPRs are highly 
likely to have family members, productive jobs, and established lives 
in the United States.70 In such cases, deportation is effectively ban-
ishment from one's home nation.71 
In addition to broadening the definition of aggravated felony, the 
Immigration Act raised the bar for re-entry into the United States af-
ter a conviction to twenty years72 and made certain aggravated felons 
ineligible for discretionary relief.73 Before 1990, LPRs convicted of 
crimes, including aggravated felons, were eligible to apply for an INA 
section 212(c) waiver of deportation.74 This discretionary provision 
allowed the Attorney General to consider mitigating factors, such as 
the individual's permanent residence status, his length of residence in 
the United States, and the effect of his deportation on family mem-
66 Id. 
67 See David Freed, Justice in Distress: The Devaluation of Crime in Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 1990, at 1; Give Criminal Aliens the Boot, A'ILANTAJOURNAL-CONSTI'IUTION, May 29, 
1990, atAl2. 
68 Ostrow, supra note 65, at A5. A General Accounting Office report on immigration 
control found that before the expedited procedures were instituted, exclusion cases taken 
to the Immigration Board of Appeals took three years to resolve. Id. 
69 See Andrew Blake, Strict Deportation Law Imperils an American Dream, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 28, 1990, at 18 (recounting the story of AI Correa, an LPR who was ordered de-
ported); Chris Hedges, Enforcement of Immigration Law Stirring Backlash, CaUfor Change: De-
fenders Cite Drop in Drug-Related Crime, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 2, 2000, at 39A (ex-
plaining that supporters of immigration restrictions believe that, without tough laws, the 
INS is "powerless against illegal aliens who "[know] how to exploit weak federal laws to 
avoid deportation"). 
70 See Blake, supra note 69, at 18; Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A. 
71 See Blake, supra note 69, at 18; Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A. 
72 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 514(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 
(1990). 
73 Id. § 511 (a). 
74 See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988). 
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bers.75 Under the Immigration Act, however, aggravated felons im-
prisoned for five years or more were made ineligible for a § 212(c) 
waiver of deportation.76 This eliminated the Attorney General's ability 
to consider mitigating factors in the case of many aggravated felons.77 
In 1991 Congress limited the class even further by withholding waivers 
from those who committed more than one aggravated felony, regard-
less of the sentence imposed.78 The harsh consequences of this provi-
sion for LPRs with established lives and families in the United States 
are not difficult to imagine. 
For example, AI Correa left Columbia with his family at the age 
of two and never returned.79 He attended grade school and high 
school in Brooklyn, went to college in Manhattan, and registered with 
the draft board at age eighteen.so Mr. Correa does not speak Span-
ish.81 He is "totally American" although "technically Columbian" sim-
ply because he failed to apply for American citizenship.82 Neverthe-
less, pursuant to the aggravated felony provision, Mr. Correa faced 
deportation to Columbia after pleading guilty to a federal charge of 
cocaine possession with intent to distribute.53 
Before this offense, Mr. Correa was employed and had no police 
record.84 The prosecutor actually requested a minimum sentence, 
admitting that Mr. Correa was the "smallest of small fry offenders" 
and simply "in the wrong place at the wrong time."85 Even the detec-
tive who arrested Mr. Correa did not believe that he should be de-
ported for this offense.86 Unfortunately, the government has "virtually 
no option even in cases like Mr. Correa's. "87 As a result of this 
inflexible law, Mr. Correa faced separation from his family, deporta-
75 See Marley, supra note 6, at 875-76 (describing § 212(c) discretionary waiver of de-
portation) . 
76 Immigration Act of 1990 § 511. 
77 See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 306(a)(10), 105 Stat. 1751; Immigration Act of1990 § 511. 
78 Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1991, 
§ 306(a) (10). 
79 Blake, supra note 69, at 18. 
oold. 
8lld. 
82 ld. 
ss ld. 
84 Blake, supra note 69, at 18. 
85 ld. 
85 ld. 
871d. 
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tion to a country that he did not remember and where he could not 
speak the language, and induction into the Columbian army.88 
2. The Harsh Effects of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment on the Aggravated 
Felony Provision: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act. 
Following the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, one 
commentator remarked that "the future is bleak for the aggravated 
felon and will probably only worsen."89 This prediction proved true.90 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was the 
first of two major laws Congress passed in 1996 addressing "immi-
grant" crime,91 although its primary focus was on preventing and pun-
ishing terrorism.92 Following the tragic Oklahoma City bombing, 
where 168 people were killed, most of the American public believed 
that Middle Eastern terrorists were responsible for the attack.93 The 
public perception that foreign terrorists were to blame had the poten-
tial to intensifY anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and isolationist tenden-
cies that were already visible in society. 94 
Accordingly, some commentators proposed comprehensive im-
migration reform to prevent the admission of alien terrorists.95 One 
journalist suggested that Congress tighten political asylum laws, more 
88 Id. 
89 Coonan, supra note 2, at 597. 
90 See Immigration and Nationality Technicality Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (1994). Consistent with past changes, Congress 
further expanded the definition of "aggravated felony· in 1994. See id. The new definition 
covered federal and state crimes, such as use of fire or explosives, gun related crimes, 
thefts and burglaries, receipt of stolen property, RICO violations with a five year sentence 
imposed, kidnapping for ransom, child pornography, prostitution, espionage, treason, 
alien smuggling, and immigration document fraud. See id.; see also infra notes 91-198. 
91 Press reports often refer to crimes committed by foreigners but fail to make distinc-
tions between immigrants, non-immigrants, and illegal aliens. See INA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101 (a) (15) (2000) (classifying immigrants); infra notes 102-112. 
92 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, pmbl., 110 
Stat 1214,1214 (1996). 
93 Richard Estrada, We Must Confront all Sources of Terrorism, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
April 28, 1995, at 29A; Harry Levins, Bomb's Death Toll Surprising: Oklahoma City Disaster 
Worse Than QJlake, Official Tells Meeting Here, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 4, 1995, at 
01C; see Editorial: No Rush toJudgment, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 27, 1995, at D08. 
94 Gerald F. Seib & John Harwood, Oklahoma City Bombing: Oklahoma City Terror May In-
tensify Hard-Line Views on Crime and Immigration, WALL ST.J., Apr. 21,1995, at A12. 
95 See Howie Carr, Bomb Begs the QJlestion: Do We Need Immigrants', BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 
21,1995, at 006; Estrada, supra note 93, at 29A. 
304 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 23:293 
effectively deport illegal aliens, and "swiftly exclude" undocumented 
newcomers by "put[ ting] them on the first return flight. "96 Other 
suggestions were more extreme; one particularly antagonistic radio 
talk show host proposed closing the borders to immigrants for "ten or 
twenty years-or maybe even a century. "97 He railed, just claim 
you're a 'political refugee' and you can come in, flop, pick up your 
food stamps and start plotting to blow up the World Trade Center. 
Doesn't matter if your carrying the HIV virus, doesn't matter if you 
hate the country. "98 
More rational commentators pled with Congress to wait for the 
horror of the bombing to pass before enacting any new laws, arguing 
that a "grieving, outraged nation" was in the "wrong frame of mind to 
consider legislation. "99 Shortly, investigators discovered that Middle 
Eastern terrorists were not to blame and, in fact, "home-grown" 
American citizens were responsible for the attack. IOO Even so, some 
analysts pointed out that the immediate suspicion of Middle Eastern 
terrorists was not "wholly irrational" given that Islamic defendants 
were on trial at the time for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
and that car bombs were used twice against Americans in Beirut.101 
Reflecting these concerns, Congress rushed to pass a law that de-
terred and punished terrorist acts by the first anniversary of the 
Oklahoma City bombing.102 The result, AEDPA, was designed to sim-
plify the prosecution of people charged with committing or planning 
terrorists attacks, limit the number of appeals for death row prisoners, 
deport more non-citizen criminals, and eliminate discretionary waiv-
ers of deportation.103 Under this law, many long-term LPRs who were 
spouses and parents of American citizens were suddenly subject to 
deportation for minor crimes and ineligible for discretionary relief.I04 
96 Estrada, supra note 93, at 29A. 
97 See Carr, supra note 95, at 006. 
96 Id. 
99 Richard Cohen, Your Liberties or Your Guns1, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1995, at A17; No 
Rush to Judgment, supra note 93, at D08. 
100 See William F. Woo, A Nation No Longer Quite So Indivisible, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, 
May 7,1995, at lB. 
101Id. 
102 See Charles V. Zehren, Anti-Terror Bill Crafted Passage Hoped by April 19, DENVER POST, 
Apr.16,1996,atA5. 
109 Editorial, A Terror of Law Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 18,1996, at 14A. 
104 Id.; Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 
Stat 1214,1214 (1996). 
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Perhaps partly for this reason, the bill was unen thusia stic ally ac-
cepted by some as the "better-than-nothing anti-terrorism bill"105 and 
roundly criticized by others as a "reactionary" law passed "in a fit of 
election year folly."106 President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law, 
even though he admitted that the legislation made "major, ill-advised 
changes in our immigration laws having nothing to do with fighting 
terrorism" and that it eliminated the most basic forms of relief for 
LPRs.107 
Specifically, AEDPA expands the aggravated felony "grab-bag of 
convictions"108 to include less serious crimes, such as bribery, counter-
feiting or mutilating a passport, obstruction of justice, gambling of-
fenses, and transportation for the purposes of prostitution.109 AEDPA 
also limits discretionary relief for individuals convicted of an aggra-
vated felony.llo Whereas the Immigration Act of 1990 had allowed ag-
gravated felons who spent less than five years in prison to apply for a 
waiver of deportation, AEDPA explicitly bars any aggravated felon 
from applying for § 212(c) discretionary relief.lll Thus, before 
AEDPA, an immigration judge would consider whether deportation 
imposed an inequitable hardship by weighing factors such as family 
ties, length of residence, rehabilitation, service in the armed forces, 
history of employment, community service, and hardship to family 
members.ll2 This Act, however, forces a court to ignore these impor-
tant considerations in the case of all aggravated felons. 
Six months after the passage of AEDPA, Congress passed the Ille-
gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) , 
which further exacerbates the consequences of an aggravated felony 
conviction by applying the provision retroactively.1l3 The passage of 
IIRIRA reflected anti-immigrant sentiment in America that ran 
105 See Zehren, supra note 102, at AS. 
106 See A Terror of Law Series, supra note 103, at 14A. 
107 See id. 
108 Coonan, supra note 2, at 600. 
109 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(e). The sentence required for 
immigration document fraud to be an aggravated felony was reduced from five years to 
eighteen months, including time suspended. [d. § 440(e) (4). The Act also made failure to 
appear for service of a sen tence an aggravated felony if the underlying offense was subject 
to a sentence of five years or more. See id. § 440(e) (8) (T). 
110 See id. § 440(d). This section eliminates the five-year term of imprisonment re-
quirement for waiver ineligibility, thus eliminating relief for all aggravated felons. See id. 
III [d. 
112 See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85. (1978). 
113 See llRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (1996) 
(codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (2000». 
306 Bostcm College Third World Law j(JUrnal [Vol. 23:293 
deeper than the fear of terrorism.1I4 The American public also held 
non-citizens responsible for the social problems plaguing society, such 
as high unemployment, drug abuse, crime rates, and the rising cost of 
social services.1I5 For example, a Congressional commission reported 
that the job skills and education of immigrants were declining, that 
they were taking jobs from Americans, and that they were committing 
more crimes; newspaper polls established that many Americans 
shared this view.1I6 Another study, however, found that the proportion 
of immigrants with less than eight years of education had in fact 
fallen, while the proportion with sixteen years or more had risen.1I7 
Furthermore, it showed that many cities with high immigrant popula-
tions had lower unemployment rates and lower crime rates than those 
with smaller immigrant populations.lIB 
The public perception that modern immigrants come to America 
with their "hands out for welfare checks" further aggravated the anti-
immigrant sentiment.1I9 In fact, however, in 1995 less than 10% of 
welfare recipients came from immigrant families.I 20 Americans also 
believed that early immigrants contributed to the country's melting 
pot image, but groundlessly found modern immigrants to be different 
and less deserving.121 Modern immigrants are of a different ethnic 
makeup than early immigrants, and perhaps many Americans were 
and continue to be unsettled by a changing ethnic landscape with 
which they cannot identify.122 In addition, modern immigrants do not 
necessarily wish to assimilate into American society as newcomers 
strove to do in the past.12!1 Rather, many immigrants choose to retain 
their distinct culture and language.124 
114 See Woo, supra note 100, at lB. 
m Marley, supra note 6, at 857. 
116 See Stephan Chapman, Old A7XUments on Immigraticm, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
June 12, 1995, at 07B; Thadeus Herrick Be James Pinkerton, Texans Favor Immigration in 
Principle/Increased Costs Are Seri(JUs Concern, HouswN CHRON., Oct. 20, 19H6, at 1 (noting 
that one in four Texans believe Hispanics are "very or extremely likely" to contribute to 
lower performing schools and higher crime); Maria Puente, Immigration Is a Negative for 
Cities, Study Says, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 1995, at 03. 
117 Chapman, supra note 116, at 7B. 
118Id. 
119 SeeWoo, supra note 100, at lB. 
120 Id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. Early immigrants were white Europeans and the majority of modern immi-
grants are not. See id. 
125Id. 
124 See Woo, supra note 100, at 1 B. 
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IIRIRA, Congress's response to this increasing anti-immigrant 
sentiment, made substantial changes to the aggravated felony provi-
sion.125 Not surprisingly, there was little resistance to the proposed 
law.126 Mter all, as one legal scholar noted, "disenfranchisement of an 
unpopular, scapegoat community that does not enjoy suffrage carries 
no political risk. "127 In its quest to reform immigration law and ap-
pease the public, however, Congress failed to make any distinctions 
between lawful permanent residents convicted of petty crimes and 
non-citizens suspected of terrorism or drug trafficking.128 Conse-
quently, some critics argued that the already harsh aggravated felony 
provisions became cruel and indiscriminate}29 
Although some serious crimes were added to the aggravated fel-
ony definition, IIRIRA's primary effect is to reduce the sentence re-
quired for defining less serious crimes as aggravated felonies}30 The 
monetary requirements for a conviction of fraud, deceit, or tax eva-
sion are also greatly reduced.131 Most drastically, IIRIRA forbids a con-
victed aggravated felon from ever returning to the United States.132 
Thus, one immigration expert noted that "incredibly, [an LPR] con-
victed of shoplifting or of having smuggled a sister into the United 
States may now be separated for life from his or her United States citi-
zen family. "133 
IIRIRA also makes it easier to obtain an aggravated felony convic-
tion by redefining the terms "conviction" and "term of imprisonment" 
in the INA.134 Before the Act, "conviction" was not statutorily defined; 
rather, most courts applied a definition created by the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Ozkok.135 The Ozkok definition 
125 See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 321 (a), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
126 See Marley, supra note 6, at 858. 
1271d. 
128 See id. 
129 See Bennett, supra note 8, at 1702-03; Marley, supra note 6, at 866. 
130 See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 321 (a). Rape and sex-
ual abuse of a minor were added to the definition, and the sentence for theft, receipt of 
stolen property, and document fraud was decreased from a five-year minimum to a one-
year requirement. See id. 
m See id. For example, the required amount for money laundering and tax evasion 
crimes was slashed to $10,000 (from $100,000 and $200,000 respectively.) See id. 
132 Seeid. § 301(b). 
m See Coonan, supra note 2, at 605. 
\34 SeeIIRIRA§ 322(a). 
155 SeeI9 I. & N. Dec. 546, 546 (B.I.A. 1988). The BIA applied a three-prong test to de-
termine what constituted a "conviction.» ld. at 546. It required that (1) a judge or jury find 
the defendant guilty or that the defendant admit guilt or sufficient facts to support a 
308 Boston CoUege Third World Law Juurnal [Vol. 23:293 
often benefited immigrants because ajudge could defer adjudication, 
meaning she could delay her decision and issue some form of proba-
tion instead.I36 As long as the individual complied with the probation-
ary requirements, no conviction was entered on the record, and the 
non-citizen was not deportable.137 
Congress sought to expand the scope of "conviction" to assure 
deportation in cases where a judgment of guilt had been suspended, 
such as in the case of deferred adjudications.13s IIRIRA, therefore, 
creates a new definition of "conviction. "139 INA section 101 (a)(48) 
states that a conviction occurs for immigration purposes even when 
the judge defers adjudication, so long as there are sufficient facts to 
establish guilt and "the judge has ordered some form of punishment, 
penalty, or restraint on the non-citizen's liberty to be imposed."l40 
This broader meaning of "conviction" exacerbates the effects of 
the ever-expanding aggravated felony definition, resulting in severe 
consequences.14l Non-citizens, including lawful permanent residents, 
need not be convicted (in the usual sense) in order to be deported as 
a "convicted" aggravated felon. 142 In addition, adjudications not 
treated as convictions by state laws nevertheless fall within IIRIRA's 
definition of conviction, producing inconsistencies between state and 
federallaw.143 
Furthermore, IIRIRA provides that any reference in the INA to 
"term of imprisonment" includes any period of time that the sentence 
finding of guilt; (2) the judge order some form of punishment, penalty or other restraint 
on defendant's liberty; (3) a defendant who received probation under a method of de-
ferred adjudication have no further hearings as to guilt or innocence in the event that he 
or she violated the terms of probation. [d. 
156 See Mariey, supra note 6, at 867. 
137 See id. 
156 See id. at 868. 
139 See id. at 867. 
140See INA § 1101 (a)(48) (A). Specifically, the definition incorporates the first two 
prongs of the Ozkok test, but removes the third prong. See Ozkok, 19 I. &. N. Dec. at 546. 
Therefore, this definition requires (1) a formal judgment of guilt entered by the court or 
(2) if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, the first two prongs of the Ozkok test must be 
applied. See id. Thus, in the event of deferred adjudication, a conviction will occur when 
(1) ajudge or jury has found the individual guilty or the non-citizen has entered a plea of 
nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt and (2) the 
judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the non-citizen's 
liberty to be imposed. See id. 
141 See Marley, supra note 6, at 867. 
142 [d. 
143 See INA § 1101 (a) (48)(A); Morawetz, supra note 6, at 1942. 
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is suspended}44 Before this amendment, the INA required a judge to 
impose a jail term in order for certain crimes to be classified as aggra-
vated felonies. 145 Thus, IIRIRA eliminates a judge's discretion to sus-
pend the sentence in an effort to avoid the deportation consequences 
of an aggravated felony conviction}46 Some critics contend that 
changing the meaning of "term of imprisonment" produces inconsis-
tent results and demonstrates a lack of respect for federal and state 
court discretion.147 Prior to IIRIRA, courts could suspend a sentence 
in cases where deportation was not justified. l48 According to the new 
terminology, a plea bargain for a one-year suspended sentence for 
theft results in deportation as an aggravated felon. 149 An eleven-
month jail term for the same offense, however, is likely to have no 
immigration consequences.150 
In accordance with the historical severity of the consequences of 
an aggravated felony conviction, IIRIRA also institutes harsh proce-
dural changes.151 Most notably, the law applies retroactively}52 A con-
viction is considered an "aggravated felony" regardless of whether the 
conviction was entered before, on, or after the date of IIRIRA's en-
actment. 153 Critics fiercely opposed this provision, arguing that it was 
the "mother of all ex post facto laws forbidden by the Constitution. "154 
The ex post facto clause in Article I of the United States Constitution, 
however, only applies to criminal proceedings, and courts have de-
termined that deportation is "a purely civil action" rather than a 
criminal proceeding.155 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld 
Congress's authority to retroactively apply immigration consequences 
to prior criminal conduct.156 
144 See IIR1RA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
145 See Marley, supra note 6, at 868. 
146 See id. at 869. 
147 See id.; Morawetz, supra note 6, at 869-70. 
148 Morawetz, supra note 6, at 869-70. 
149 SeeINA § 1101 (a) (43) (G); Marley, supra note 6, at 869. 
150 SeeINA § 1101 (a)(43) (G); Marley, supra note 6, at 869. 
151 See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 304, 305, 321 (b), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
1521IRIRA§ 321(b). 
153Id. 
154 Hakeem Ishola, Of Convictions and Removal: The Impact of New Immigration Law on 
Criminal Aliens, UTAH BJ., Aug. 10, 1997, at 18, 22. 
155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be 
passed"). See e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Fong The Ting v. 
U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
156 See e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529, 531 (1953). 
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The harsh provisions of the 1996 laws, particularly the retroactive 
effect of llRlRA, attracted widespread media attention.157 Reports un-
covered that the INS, pursuant to these laws, began deporting LPRs 
because minor crimes they had committed years before had since be-
come aggravated felonies. 158 For example, in 1987, twenty-one year 
old Alejandro Bontia was convicted of sexual contact with a minor for 
having sex with his sixteen year-old girlfriend, because her mother was 
angry about the relationship and reported Mr. Bontia to the police.l59 
Almost fifteen years later, he faced separation from his wife and child 
solely because of this "youthful dalliance. "160 Nigerian native Olufo-
lake Olaleye became a permanent resident in 1990, and both of her 
children were born in the United States.161 She was ordered deported 
based on a six-year old conviction for shoplifting baby clothes worth 
$14.99.162 
Another procedural change IIRIRA instituted is "expedited re-
moval" of convicted aggravated felons. l63 This provision provoked due 
process concerns, because non-citizens can be deported without ever 
seeing an immigration judge.164 Furthermore, once a judge issues a 
removal order, llRlRA mandates that the individual be detained until 
he is deported.1OO The consequences of this provision are severe. 
Mandatory detention could require incarceration thousands of miles 
away from family members while awaiting the results of lengthy and 
uncertain appeals. 1OO Moreover, if the non-citizen's native country re-
fuses to allow his return, the statute's plain language contemplates 
perpetual detainment in the United StateS.167 This provision, like the 
expedited removal provision, raised due process questions, which the 
United States Supreme Court finally addressed in Zadvydas v. Davis.168 
157 See Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A; Eric Rich, Deportations Soar Under mgid Law, 
HAR'IFORD COURANT, Oct. 8, 2000, at AI. 
158 See Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A; Rich, supra note 157, at AI. 
159 Hedges, supra note 69, at 39A. 
160 [d. 
161 Rich, supra note 157, at AI. 
162 [d. 
168 llRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304,110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1228). Expedited removal allows the Attorney General to complete removal proceedings 
and any administrative appeals before the non-citizen is released from prison for the un-
derlying aggravated felony conviction, provided that the individual is not a permanent 
resident or has completed less than two years of permanent residency. See id. 
164 See Marley, supra note 6, at 873. 
166 See llRIRA § 305. 
166 See Morawetz, supra note 6, at 1947. 
167 See llRIRA § 305. 
168 See generaUy 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
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In that case the Court determined that reasonable time limits for de-
tention must be read into the statute.169 
Emma Mendez De Hay's story illustrates the harsh effects of 
IIRlRA's retroactive application and detention provisions. Ms. Men-
dez De Hay is a thirty-nine year old mother of four who had lived in 
the United States for twenty years but was detained thousands of miles 
away from her family and faced deportation for a "stupid mistake."170 
In 1990, Ms. Mendez De Hay's Spanish-speaking cousin received a 
phone call at Ms. Mendez De Hay's home.171 When Ms. Mendez De 
Hay answered, her cousin asked her to "tell [the caller] I can't help 
him today. I'll help him tomorrow." 172 Because her cousin did not 
speak English well, Ms. Mendez De Hay relayed this message to the 
caller. 173 
The caller was an undercover narcotics officer, and Ms. Mendez 
De Hay was subsequently found guilty of using a communication de-
vice to facilitate the distribution of cocaine.174 Despite her innocence, 
she pled guilty in exchange for a promise that she would not be rec-
ommended for incarceration and would not be deported. 175 Since 
1992, she had been a restaurant manager and had planned to prepare 
for work as a translator.176 In 1996, however, Ms. Mendez De Hay was 
stopped by the INS while returning from a trip to Italy with her fiance 
and was detained immediately on the basis of that guilty plea.177 To 
make matters worse, she was sent to a Louisiana facility, far away from 
her family'S home in Washington stateP8 She was particularly con-
cerned about being separated from her two youngest children and 
her mother, who had been hospitalized for complications from heart 
disease and diabetes. 179 Mter five months of detention, Ms. Mendez 
De Hay considered giving up and returning to Mexico. She did not 
wan t to leave her family, however, and chose to pursue her appeal 
169 See id. at 701. The Court read a limiting principle into the statute requiring a peri-
odic review of an individual's likelihood of removal. See id. IT removal is not reasonably 
foreseeable, the government must release the non-citizen. See id. 
170 Peggy Anderson, Immigrant Faces Deportation Under Tough INS Laws, OREGONIAN, 
Feb. 14,2000, at E7. 
171 Id. 
172Id. 
mId. 
174 Id. 
175 Anderson, supra note 170, at E7. 
176Id. 
I77 Id. 
178Id. 
179Id. 
312 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 23:293 
rather than submit to deportation. ISO Mter a grueling two-year fight to 
stay in the United States, her deportation order was finally lifted when 
a United States Supreme Court decision invalidated certain deporta-
tion orders. lSI 
In IIRIRA, Congress did not stop at broadening statutory 
definitions, instituting procedural changes, and applying the law ret-
roactively. Where AEDPA had severely circumscribed routes to relief 
from deportation, IIRIRA essentially eliminates them.lS2 The Act 
completely repeals the § 212(c) waiver of deportationl83 and, in its 
place, institutes cancellation of removal.lM The new provision gives 
the Attorney General discretion to cancel removal for some non-
citizens, relief for which aggravated felons are categorically ineligi-
ble,185 Finally, the Act severely limits judicial review of removal orders 
for aggravated felons. 1OO In summary, an individual convicted of an 
aggravated felony is left with essentially no relief-an immigration 
judge has no authority to consider mitigating factors, and the depor-
tation order is not subject to judicial review. lS7 
Antonio Cesar Chamorro's situation embodies the distressing 
effects of repealing the waiver provisions. l88 In 1993, Mr. Chamorro 
completed a three and a half-year sentence for money laundering.189 
Mr. Chamorro had been a legal permanent resident since 1972. had 
180 See Anderson, supra note 170, at E7. 
181 Susan Gilmore, Mother Won't Be Deported After All: '92 Conviction Had Left Her in 
Limbo, SEATI'LE TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at AI. Her order was lifted after the United States 
Supreme Court decided that certain individuals could not be deported retroactively. See 
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320-26 (2001). 
182 SeeIIRlRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 (eliminat-
ing § 212(c) waivers of deportation). 
18!1Id. In 2001 the Supreme Court held that § 212(c) relief remains available for non-
citizens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and would have been 
eligible for the relief at the time of their plea. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320-26. Thus, the 
decision offers hope to only a narrow group of individuals and does nothing to reinstate 
the balance of equities required under the old § 212(c) provision. See id. 
184 IIRIRA § 304(a). 
\I!5 See id. 
1/J1j Id. § 306(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C.§ 1252(a) (2)(C». Congress removed all courts' 
jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against non-citizens ordered deported as 
aggravated felons. See id. 
187 See id; IIRIRA § 304(a). Many critics argued that this bar to judicial review was un-
constitutional; the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in INS v. St. (;yr. See 533 U.S. 
at 289. The Court held that Congress did not repeal the writ of habeas corpus for review of 
deportation orders, thereby leaving a habeas challenge available to non-citizens. See id. 
188 Jo Ann Zuniga, Deportation IWles Break up Families, INS Critics Charge, HOUSTON 
CHRON., May 31,1998, at 29. 
188Id. 
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married a citizen, and had two sons, both born in the United States.190 
Mter considering these factors, an immigration judge approved a 
§ 212(c) waiver of deportation, and Mr. Chamorro was allowed to re-
turn to his family.l91 In 1997, however, Mr. Chamorro was suddenly 
deported to his native Chile after an immigration judge struck down 
the waiver pursuant to the 1996 laws.192 Mr. Chamorro's family was 
forced to declare bankruptcy and decide whether to remain separated 
from their husband and father or move to Chile.193 Mr. Chamorro's 
wife criticized the 1996 law for making her choose between her hus-
band and her country and for "destroying numerous families. "194 
In summary, the aggravated felony provision of the INA has un-
dergone a transformation since its inception in 1988. Congress has 
consistently broadened the provision, primarily by defining less seri-
ous crimes as aggravated felonies. 195 Changing the statutory definition 
190 Id. 
191Id. 
192Id. 
198 Zuniga, supra note 188, at 29. 
194Id. 
195 See INA, 8 U.S.C § 1101 (a) (43) (2000); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469 (1988). To compare, consider the difference be-
tween the ADAA's definition and the INA's current definition. The 1988 ADAA definition 
of an aggravated felony read: "The term 'aggravated felony' means murder, any drug 
trafficking crime ... or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices ... or 
any attempt or conspiracy to commit such an act, committed within the United States." 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7342. In contrast to this short provision limited to serious 
crimes, the definition of "aggravated felony" currently includes: 
(A) murder, rape or sexual abuse of a minor; (B) illicit trafficking in a con-
trolled substance ... including a drug trafficking crime ... ; (C) illicit 
trafficking in firearms or destructive devices ... or in explosive materials ... ; 
(D) ... laundering of monetary instruments or ... engaging in monetary 
transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity if the amount 
of the funds exceeded $10,000. (E) (i) ... explosive materials offenses; (ii) ... 
firearms offenses; or (iii) [a different section of the United States Code also] 
relating to firearms offenses; (F) a crime of violence ... for which the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year; (G) a theft offense (including receipt of 
stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment is at 
least one year; (H) an offense ... relating to the demand for or receipt of 
ransom; (I) ... child pornography; (j) an offense ... relating to racketeer 
influenced corrupt organizations or ... gambling offenses for which a sen-
tence of one year imprisonment or more may be imposed; (K) (i) ... owning, 
controlling, managing or supervising of a prostitution business; (ii) ... trans-
portation for the purposes of prostitution if committed for commercial ad-
vantage; or (iii) ... peonage, slavery, and involuntary servitude; (L) (i) ... 
gathering or transmitting national defense information ... disclosure of 
classified information ... sabotage [or] treason; (ii) ... protecting the iden-
tity of undercover intelligence agents; or (iii) [another provision] relating to 
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of "conviction" and "term of imprisonmen t," as well as decreasing the 
minimum term of imprisonment required, further broadens the 
scope of the provision.l96 Moreover, aggravated felons are ineligible 
for the discretionary relief that previously had allowed judges to con-
sider mitigating factors. 197 Finally, the consequences of a removal or-
der have become progressively harsher and now include mandatory 
detention, limited judicial review, and a permanent bar from return-
ing to the United States.l98 In fact, the consequences of an aggravated 
felony provision are so harsh that, if one applies international human 
rights standards, it becomes clear that the provision violates a univer-
sally recognized fundamental human right. 
protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents. (M) an offense that 
- (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000; or (ii) ... tax evasion in which the revenue loss to the government 
exceeds $10,000. (N) ... alien smuggling [unless first offense and the pur-
pose was to only aid certain family members]; (0) [relating to previously de-
ported aggravated felons] (P) ... falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mu-
tilating, or altering a passport or instrument or [violating a United States 
Code section] relating to document fraud ... for which the term of impris-
onment is at least 12 months ... (Q) ... failure to appear by a defendant for 
service of sentence if the underlying offense in punishable by imprisonment 
for a term of five years or more; (R) ... commercial bribery, counterfeiting, 
forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have 
been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; (S) ... 
obstruction of justice, perjury, or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a wit-
ness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; (T) ... failure 
to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or to dispose 
of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of two years imprisonment or 
more may be imposed; and (U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an of-
fense described in this paragragh. The term applies to an offense described 
in this paragraph whether in violation of a Federal or State law and applies to 
such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term 
of imprisonment was completed within the last 15 years. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of the law (including any effective date), the term applies re-
gardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after [the date 
of the enactment of this paragraph]. 
INA§ 1101(a)(43). 
196 See id.; § 1101 (a) (43), (48) (A) (defining "conviction"), and (B) (defining "term of 
imprisonment") . 
197 See id. § 212(c) (citing that this section has been repealed), 1229b (barring aggra-
vated felons from applying for cancellation of removal). 
198 See id. §§ 1231, 1252(a)(2) (c), 1182 (a) (9)(A)(i). 
2003] Aggravated Felony Provision as a Human Rights Violation 315 
II. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT 
TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE OR FAMILY LIFE AS A DEFENSE TO 
DEPORTATION 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
Convention) establishes an individual's fundamental right to respect 
for private and family life. l99 Non-nationals2°O convicted of crimes in 
the signatory countries have invoked this right to prevent deporta-
tion.201 The European Court of Human Rights, taking into account 
both the individual's interest in "respect of his private or family life" 
and the government's need to control crime, has found that deporta-
tion violates this fundamental right in certain circumstances.202 
Non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies in the United States 
do not have the benefit of a balancing test like that applied by the 
European Court. Because Article 8 requires consideration of the 
competing individual and government interests, the INA's approach is 
inconsistent with the protection of the fundamental right to respect 
for private and family life.203 
A. Article 8 oj the Convention: The Right to Respect Jor 
Private and Family Life 
The European Convention on Human Rights was implemented 
in 1950 to encourage collective enforcement of the fundamental hu-
man rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948.204 In the past half-century, the enforcement tribunals of the 
Convention-the European Commission of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)-have produced the 
world's most extensive body of international human rights jurispru-
199 Convention, supra note 17, at 230. 
200 The European Court refers to citizens of a particular nation as "nationals." 
201 See, e.g., Boultifv. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 1184-89 
(2001) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Dalia v. France, App. NO. 26102/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625,641-46 
(1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 750-
53 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia v. France, App. No. 23078/93, 25 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 686, 704-08 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
202 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230; see, e.g., Bouttif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189; Me-
hemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753. 
205 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230; see, e.g., Bouttif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189; Me-
hemi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753. 
204 Convention, supra note 17, at 222-23. 
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dence.205 Article 8 of the Convention establishes an individual's right 
to respect for his private and family life.206 The Article states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the inter-
ests of national security, public safety, or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of rights and freedoms of others.207 
Thus, paragraph one of Article 8 acknowledges that: each indi-
vidual possesses this right.208 Paragraph two asserts that no public 
authority may interfere with the exercise of this right unless the inter-
ference is (1) in accordance with the law, (2) necessary in a demo-
cratic society, and (3) in the interests of one of the stated aims.209 
The ECHR has consistently held that the meaning of both "family 
life" and "private life" must be construed broadly.210 The ECHR also 
broadly interprets a contracting state's duties under Article 8.211 The 
Article expressly forbids a public authority'S arbitrary interference 
with this right; rather, it requires that any interference must fall within 
one of the specified legitimate aims.212 
205 Strossen, supra note 20, at 807. 
206 Convention, supra note 17, at 230. 
207 Id. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 Strossen, supra note 20, at 843-44. The concept of family life clearly includes rela-
tionships between husbands and wives, parents and children, and near relatives, such as 
grandparents. Goran Cvetic, Immig;ration Cases in Stasbourg: The Right to Family Life Under 
Article 8 o/the European Convention, 36 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 647, 650-51 (1987). The Court 
has adopted a wider view of family, however, making no distinctions between children born 
to married parents and those born out of wedlock. Strossen, supra note 20, at 844 (citing X 
v. Iceland, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 86, 87 (1976»; Cvetic, supra, at 651. Furthermore, the 
meaning of private life extends beyond "a right to live, as far as one wishes, protected from 
publicity" and includes the general right to establish and develop relationships with others, 
particularly for the fulfillment and growth of one's own personality. Strossen, supra note 
20, at 843. 
211 See Strossen, supra note 20, at 842. 
212 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230. In some cases, the ECHR has actually ex-
tended a state's obligation beyond mere noninterference and imposed an affirmative duty 
on the state, as well as non-governmental actors, to protect this right. Strossen, supra note 
20, at 846-49 (noting that the court imposed an affirmative duty on the Belgian govern-
ment to invalidate discriminatory laws against children born out of wedlock, on the Irish 
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In addition, the ECHR has expressly stated that clauses limiting 
privacy rights, such as paragraph two of Article 8, must be narrowly 
interpreted.213 Thus, the court has repeatedly affirmed that paragraph 
two of Article 8 requires that any intrusion be necessary for promot-
ing the asserted government interest, rather than a mere convenience 
or preference.214 Furthermore, the ECHR will not allow intrusions 
that would actually damage democratic values while purporting to 
promote them.215 This requirement is derived from paragraph two's 
assertion that necessity must be considered within the context of a 
democratic society.216 Considering these two elements together, the 
ECHR repeatedly explains that in order to be necessary in a demo-
cratic society, there must be a "pressing social need" and in particular, 
the intrusion "must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pur-
sued. "217 Accordingly, the court has refused to allow interference with 
rights if there is a less intrusive method available.218 Furthermore, the 
ECHR may still prohibit the alternative method if the attendant pri-
vacy invasion outweighs the government's interest.219 
An examination of the ECHR's approach to deportation orders 
issued on crilninal grounds and contested under Article 8 allows for 
an interesting comparison between the actions of the court and the 
aggravated felony provisions of the INA. In such cases, the ECHR first 
considers whether the non-national actually maintains a family or pri-
vate life in the deporting country.220 The court, as noted above, inter-
prets the concept of family and private life broadly, so meeting this 
burden is not difficult.221 Second, the court determines whether the 
state interfered with the individual's right to respect for private and 
government to provide legal aid for individuals seeking judicially recognized marriage 
separations, and required alteration of a Belgian criminal law, even though the invasion 
was by a non-governmental actor); A.M. Connelly, Problems of Interpretation of Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 35 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 567, 568-69 (1986). 
215 See Strossen, supra note 20, at 849. 
214 Id. at 850. 
215 Id. at 851. 
216 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230. 
217 See, e.g., Boultifv. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 1184-89 
(2001) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Dalia v. France, App. NO. 26102/95, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625,641-46 
(1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi V. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 750-
53 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia V. France, App. No. 23078/93, 25 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 686, 704-08 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
218 See Strossen, supra note 20, at 853. 
219 See id. at 854. 
220 See, e.g., Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 642; Mehemi, 
30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 750; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 704. 
221 See supra note 210. 
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family life.222 Applicants facing deportation generally focus on the 
state's interference with their family, rather than private, lives.223 In 
response, the court has consistently found that removing a person 
from a country where close members of his family are living consti-
tutes an infringement of the right to respect for family life.224 
IT the court finds that deportation constitutes an interference 
under Article 8, it considers whether the interference is nevertheless 
acceptable under paragraph two.225 To satisfy the conditions of para-
graph two, the deportation order must be "in accordance with the 
law," must pursue one of the specified legitimate aims, and must be 
"necessary in a democratic society" to achieve the stated aim.226 
A state acts "in accordance with the law" as long as it adheres to a 
specific, recognized law.227 Furthermore, the states can typicallyestab-
lish that deportation of criminals furthers the legitimate aim of pre-
venting disorder or crime.228 Generally, the sole point of contention is 
whether the individual's deportation is "necessary in a democratic 
society" to achieve that aim.229 This inquiry focuses on whether the 
state has established a "pressing social need" and whether the state's 
action is "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. "230 In other 
words, the court considers whether the state has reached a fair bal-
ance between the individual's interest in her right to respect for fam-
212 See Booltif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 642; Mehem~ 30 
Eur. H.R. Rep. at 750; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 704. The Court occasionally com-
bines these first two inquiries. See Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186. 
225 See Ann Sherlock, Deportation of Aliens and Article 8 ECHR, 23 EVIl. L. REv. 62, 68, 
Checklist No. I, (1998). 
224 See Booltif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 643; Mehem~ 30 
Eur. H.R. Rep. at 751; Boochelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 705. 
225 See Convention, supra note 17, at 230. 
226 Convention, supra note 17, at 230. 
227 Booltif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 643; Mehemi, 30 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. at 751; Boochelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 705. 
128 See Booltif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1186-87; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1543; Mehem~ 30 
Eur. H.R. Rep. at 751; Boochelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 706. 
229 See Sherlock, supra note 223, at 64. When deciding whether a deportation order is 
necessary in a democratic society, the Court first recognizes that maintaining public order 
is the responsibility of the contracting states and that part of that duty is controlling the 
entry and continued residence of non-nationals, subject to any treaty obligations. [d. This 
power, of course, encompasses the right to deport aliens. [d. The Court then qualifies that 
power, however, asserting that if deportation interferes with the right to respect for family 
and private life, it must be justified as necessary in a democratic society. [d. 
2SO See Booltif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1187; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 644; Mellem;, 30 
Eur. H.R. Rep. at 752; Boochelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707. 
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ily or private life and the state's interest in preventing disorder or 
crime.231 
To determine if this balance has been achieved, the ECHR con-
siders the amount of time a non-national has lived in the deporting 
state, whether her family resides there, whether she has any ties to an-
other state, her likelihood of successfully re-establishing family life in 
another state, and the effect of deportation on her family in the de-
porting state.232 The court also considers the seriousness of the of-
fense and the applicant's record since the offense was committed.233 
Recent cases show that the ECHR is likely to find a violation of 
Article 8 in situations where the applicant has strong family ties in the 
deporting state and lacks such ties in his native nation.234 For exam-
ple, in Mehemi v. France, the court found an Article 8 violation where 
the applicant had strong ties to France and lacked such ties to his na-
tive country of Algeria.235 Mr. Mehemi was actually born in France, 
but lost citizenship,236 received all of his schooling in France, and 
lived there until he was deported.237 Furthermore, his wife and chil-
dren remained in France, and the court found that it would have 
been difficult for them to make a life in Algeria or in Italy, his wife's 
native country, because it would mean a "radical upheaval" for their 
children.238 In light of these considerations, the court found that even 
though the applicant's crime involved a conspiracy to import large 
quantities of marijuana, deporting him would be too great an inter-
ference in his family life.239 
Moreover, the court has found a violation of Article 8 where the 
applicant had weaker family ties in the deporting state than did the 
applicant in Mehemi.240 In Boultifv. Switzerland, the applicant was re-
cently married to a Swiss national.241 Switzerland refused to renew Mr. 
251 See Sherlock, supra note 223, at 64. 
2!2 Id; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 644-45; Melumi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753. 
255 BoultiJ, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1187; Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 645; Melumi, 30 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. at 753; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707. 
2M See BoultiJ, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189; Melumi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753. 
255 See Melumi, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753. 
2!16 Id. at 751-52. Mr. Mehemi's parents had failed to claim citizenship for him as re-
quired by legislation governing the effects of Algeria's independence on nationality. See id. 
257 Id. at 753. 
2!16Id. 
259 Id. 
240 See BoultiJ, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1189. 
241 Id. at 1188. 
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Boultifs residence permit,242 based on a conviction for robbery, dam-
age to property, and physically attacking another individua1.243 Find-
ing that the deportation order violated Article 8, the court focused on 
the effect of Mr. Boultifs deportation on his Swiss wife, reasoning that 
she could not be expected to follow her husband to Algeria because 
she had no ties there besides her mother-in-law and did not speak 
Arabic.244 In addition, although Mr. Boultif lawfully resided in Italy for 
three years after being forced to leave Switzerland, the state could not 
establish that Mr. Boultif and his wife could obtain authorization to 
live in Italy.245 The court also noted that Mr. Boultif had committed no 
further offenses since his crime six years before, that he was consis-
tently employed, and that he had the possibility of continuing em-
ployment.246 Thus, the court found that the interference was dispro-
portionate to the government's aim; allowing the applicant to remain 
in Switzerland presented a relatively limited danger to public order, 
whereas forbidding him from living there posed a serious impediment 
to his family life.247 
By contrast, if the applicant'S family ties in the deporting country 
are not very strong and the applicant has also maintained relation-
ships in another country, the court generally finds no violation of Ar-
ticle 8.248 For example, in Dalia v. France, the court found the balance 
favored the government, even though many of Ms. Dalia's family 
members lived in France.249 The court noted that the applicant had 
lived in Algeria until the age of seventeen or eighteen (without her 
parents for two of those years), maintained family and social relation-
ships there, and spoke the local language. Therefore, according to 
the court, "her Algerian nationality is not merely a legal fact but 
reflects certain social and emotional links. "250 Furthermore, the appli-
can t was convicted of heroin trafficking, which the court found to be 
242 This was functionally equivalent to deportation because he was re'quired to leave 
Switzerland. See id. at 1181-82. 
24! See id. 
244 See id. at 1188. 
245 Boultif, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1188. 
246 See id. at 1189. 
247 [d. at 1189. 
248 See Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 645; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707. 
249 See Dalia, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 644. The applicant's mother and seven brothers and 
sisters lived in France. [d. She had married a French national, but they were divorced. [d. 
She gave birth to a child of French nationality after the deportation was issued, but the 
Court only considers the circumstances at the time the order was issued. See id. at 644-45. 
250 [d. 
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a serious offense.251 Given the existence of family and social ties in 
Algeria and the seriousness of the crime, the court held that the de-
portation order was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pur-
sued by the state.252 
Likewise, in Bouchelkia v. France, the court found no violation of 
Article 8.253 There, the court focused on the gravity of the crime, an 
aggravated rape, and Mr. Bouchelkia's subsequent convictions for at-
tempting to escape from prison and obstructing a police officer in the 
execution of his duty.254 Additionally, although he had lived in France 
since age two and although many of his family members lived there,255 
the applicant had close relatives in Algeria and understood the lan-
guage.256 Thus, the court held that a fair balance was struck between 
the relevant interests of the applicant and the government and con-
sequently, the decision to deport Mr. Bouchelkia was not dispropor-
tionate to the legitimate aims pursued.257 
If the balancing test employed by the European Court of Human 
Rights were applied to assess the deportability of aggravated felons 
under United States immigration law, the deportation of lawful per-
manent residents convicted of relatively minor crimes would be for-
bidden.258 Xuan Wilson would not be forced to return to a long for-
gotten country because she forged a check for $19.83.259 Al Correa 
would be permitted to remain with the rest of his family in Brooklyn, 
his home since age two, rather than struggle to survive in an utterly 
foreign land.260 Emma Mendez De Hay would not have been de-
tained, separated from her family, or forced to fight a protracted 
court battle because of a "stupid mistake. "261 Anthony Cesar 
251 See id. at 645. 
252 See id. 
253 Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707. 
254 See id. at 706-07. 
255 The applicant's mother and siblings lived in France. [d. at 704-05. More impor-
tantly, even though his wife and daughter also lived there, those connections were formed 
after the deportation order was issued. See id. at 704. The Court does not consider family 
ties created after the deportation order was made. See id. 
256 [d. at 706. 
257 Seeid. at 707. 
258 See supra notes 248-257 and accompanying text; infra notes 259-273 and accom-
panying text. 
259 See supra notes 9-12, 248-258 and accompanying text, infra notes 260-273 and ac-
companying text. 
260 See supra notes 83-92, 248-259 and accompanying text, infra notes 261-273 and 
accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 177-187, 248-260 and accompanying text, infra notes 262-273 and 
accompanying text. 
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Chamorro's waiver of deportation would not have been retroactively 
revoked, forcing him out of the United States permanently and com-
pelling his family members to choose between him and their coun-
try.262 In each of these cases, the European Court almost certainly 
would find that deporting these individuals is not necessary in a 
democratic society.263 Deportation poses a grave threat to the family 
lives of these lawful permanent residents, whereas their relatively mi-
nor crimes present a limited danger to public order.264 
III. Applying International Law to Achieve a Fair Balance in 
Deportation Decisions 
The United States is not a party to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It is, however, a member of the United Nations, which 
has adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.265 In fact, 
the United States played a key role in drafting the Declaration.266 The 
European Convention was later implemented to encourage enforce-
ment of the Declaration.267 Since that time, the enforcement tribunals 
of the Convention have produced the most developed body of inter-
national human rights jurisprudence.268 Moreover, U.S. court rulings 
have relied on the Convention, and the cases applying it" as a major 
source of international rights law.269 Thus, the Convention has be-
come customary international law based upon its breadth, period of 
acceptance, and the opinions of scholars and judges.27o 
It is well established that U.S. courts may not ignore the precepts 
of customary international law.271 Furthermore, customary interna-
262 See supra notes 194-200, 248-261 and accompanying text, infra ntoes 263-273 and 
accompanying text. 
268 See supra notes 246-250 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 246-250 and accompanying text .. 
265 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A(ll), U.N. Doc A/81O, at 71 
(1948); see Beharryv. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
266 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 595. 
267 Convention, supra note 17, at 222. 
268 Strossen, supra note 20, at 807. 
269 Id. 
270 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 597; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876, 884 n.16 
(2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing that judicial decisions constitute a source of customary inter-
national law and citing a decision issued by the European Court of Human Rights); Fer-
nandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980), afl'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 
1981) (citing European Convention as one of the principal sources of fundamental human 
rights and "indicative of the customs and usages of civilized nations"). 
271 See, e.g., The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1899). 
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tional law is legally enforceable unless Congress unequivocally super-
cedes it by statute.272 Thus, if Congress has not specifically stated that 
customary international law, such as the dictates of the Convention, 
are superceded, a court should construe a statute to bring it into con-
formity with in ternationallaw. 273 
In addition, the United States ratified the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR) in 1992.274 One prominent legal 
scholar noted that, although the customary human rights law of na-
tions already bound the United States, the Covenant provided an 
"authoritative, textual exposition of protected rights and routinized 
mechanisms for their enforcement" lacking in customary human 
rights law.275 The ICCPR requires that a non-citizen be given an op-
portunity to submit his reasons against deportation and also mandates 
protection of family life.276 Article 13 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights requires a state to provide an individual 
with the opportunity to oppose his deportation, absent compelling 
reasons of national security, stating: 
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the pres-
ent Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance 
of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, ex-
cept where compelling reasons of national security require, 
be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and 
to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the pur-
poses before, the competent authority or a person or per-
sons especially designated by the competent authority.277 
Furthermore, the ICCPR assures protection of family rights; Article 17 
is very similar to Article 8 of the Convention, stating that "no one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his pri-
vacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation" and that "everyone has the right to the pro-
tection of the law against such interference or attacks. "278 Article 
272 See Beharry. 183 F. Supp.2d. at 600; Ralph G. Steinhardt. The Role of International 
Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction. 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103. 1165 (1990). 
278 See id. 
274 John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of The United States 
&tification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARv. HUM. Rrs.J. 59. 
59 (1993) (emphasis added). 
275 See id. 
276 See ICCPR. supra note 17. at 176-77. 
277 Id. at 176. 
278 Id. at 177. 
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23 (1) likewise emphasizes that "the family is the natural and funda-
mental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the State. "279 
Like customary international law, U.S. courts may not ignore 
treaty obligations and should construe domestic law in compliance 
with them whenever possible.280 Even though non-self-executing trea-
ties, such as the ICCPR, do not automatically become domestic law, a 
few courts and commentators have suggested that non-self-executing 
treaties do have domestic effect as evidence of international law prin-
ciples and as a tool of statutory construction.281 
In a recent unprecedented decision, Judge Weinstein of the East-
ern District of New York applied the international legal concepts dis-
cussed above to overturn a deportation order pursuant to the aggra-
vated felony provision.282 In &harry v. Reno, Mr. Beharry was ordered 
deported as an aggravated felon because he stole $714.00.283 He had 
been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for twenty 
years, since age seven, completed school through the eleventh grade 
in the United States, and was consistently employed after leaving 
schoo1.284 Mr. Beharry's mother was also an LPR, and his sister and 
six-year-old daughter were both United States citizens.285 
At the time Mr. Beharry committed his crime, he was not consid-
ered an aggravated felon because the provision required a term of 
imprisonment of five years, and he only served four and a half.286 By 
the time he was convicted, however, Congress had passed IIRIRA, 
which requires a sentence of only one year to be considered an aggra-
vated felon.287 In an effort to remain with his family, Mr. Beharry un-
successfully sought a number of deportation waivers and was denied a 
hearing by the INS, primarily because the waivers were not available 
to aggravated felons after the changes made by the 1996 laws.288 
279 Id. at 179. 
280 See, e.g., The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1899). 
281 See Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001); Beharry v. Reno, 
183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 594-95 (E.n.N.y. 2002) (citing cases from the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals and legal scholarship). Ratified self-executing treaties do have the 
force of domestic law. Fosterv. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,314 (1829). 
282 See Bellarry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 586. 
285 183 F. Supp. 2d at 586. 
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Judge Weinstein determined that it was not clear whether the 
new definition of an aggravated felony applied to Mr. Beharry.289 Rely-
ing on sources of international law, he held that Mr. Beharry must be 
granted a hearing to show the effect that his deportation would have 
on his family and himself, weighed against the risks of allowing him to 
remain in the United States.290 Considering the effect of treaties and 
customary international law on domestic law, Judge Weinstein wrote 
that "[iJmmigration statutes must be woven into the seamless web of 
our national and international law. "291 
First, Judge Weinstein recognized that non self-executing trea-
ties,292 such as the ICCPR, have been accorded domestic effect in 
some United States federal courts and are evidence of binding princi-
ples of international law.293 In addition, he found it significant that 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had noted that existing 
U.S. law generally complied with the ICCPR.294 Thus, he reasoned 
that deporting Mr. Beharry without giving him an opportunity to pre-
sent reasons against his deportation violated the ICCPR's Article 17 
guarantee against arbitrary interference with one's family and the Ar-
ticle 13 right to submit reasons against expulsion.295 
Judge Weinstein also relied on principles protecting the right to a 
hearing before "arbitrary exile," stated in the Universal Declaration 
and the protection of the family assured in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC).296 He asserted that both of these instru-
ments have the force of customary internationallaw.297 Although the 
Declaration is not a treaty, it has become the "accepted general articu-
lation of recognized rights. "298 The CRC, while not yet ratified by the 
United States, has been ratified by every other organized government 
in the world and codifies long-standing legal norms assisting and pro-
tecting the family.299 
289 See id. at 589 (noting that the Supreme Court had not addressed whether the 
definition of aggravated felon applies retroactively when the crime itself predated the 1996 
changes but the conviction came after the 1996 acts). 
290 Id. at 586. 
291 Id. at 591. 
292 Self-executing treaties are effective immediately upon ratification without need for 
any implementing legislation. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1354 (7th ed. 1999). 
295 Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95. 
294 Id. at 595. 
295 Id. at 604. 
296 Id. at 594-96. 
297 Id. at 596. 
298 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
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Judge Weinstein astutely noted another reason for applying in-
ternational law to construe immigration statutes by comparing immi-
gration law to admiralty law. He reasoned that the Supreme Court has 
most frequently addressed the concept of customary international law 
in admiralty cases, where domestic law is likely to clash with interna-
tionallaw.30o Immigration law is likewise founded on concepts of in-
ternationallaw; Congress's plenary power over immigration is based 
on the idea, derived from international law, that an essential power of 
sovereign nations is the ability to forbid entry to foreign nationals.301 
Thus, Congress would not hold such expansive power without the ex-
istence of international norms.302 Given that immigration law is 
rooted in these norms, Judge Weinstein reasoned that it must likewise 
be limited by changing international law norms.303 Accordingly, "[i) t 
is inappropriate to sustain such plenary power based on a 1920 un-
derstanding of international law when the 2002 conception is radi-
cally differen t. "304 
Judge Weinstein's dependence on international agreements and 
customary international law results in a balancing test similar to that 
applied by the European Court of Human Rights in the deportation 
cases discussed above.305 It takes into account family relationships that 
would be seriously impeded by deportation and weighs the relative 
importance of those factors against the government's reasons to de-
port.306 Thus, this approach brings United States immigration law into 
conformity with international human rights law and incorporates the 
reasoning of the most prolific human rights tribunal.307 
Given that Judge Weinstein's approach is based on a particular 
ambiguous provision of the INA, however, this compassionate and 
reasonable approach is available to only a small subset of individu-
als-namely, immigrants who committed a crime before that particular 
BOO See id. at 597-98. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1899); The 
Neriede, 13 U.S. 388(1815). 
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!lOg [d. 
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!lO5 See id. at 586; Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1179, 
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644 (1999) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Mehemi v. France, App. No. 25017/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739, 
752 (1997) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Bouchelkia v. France, App. No. 23018/93, 25 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 686,707 (1997) ( (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Sherlock, supra note 223, at 64. 
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Eur. H.R. Rep. at 752; Bouchelkia, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707; Strossen, supra note 20 at 807. 
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crime was deemed an aggravated felony and who would have been 
otherwise eligible for a discretionary waiver.308 The few courts that 
have addressed the issue since Beharry have staunchly refused to ex-
tend the reasoning to individuals who do not meet this criterion.309 In 
addition, other jurisdictions are not bound to take a similar, compas-
sionate approach. In fact, one court has already disagreed with Judge 
Weinstein's reasoning.310 Thus, the majority of "aggravated felons"-
all but those lucky few whose cases depend upon this ambiguous provi-
sion and who appear in front of a court willing to take a bold step like 
Judge Weinstein's-are still left with essentially no relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For lawful permanent residents convicted of aggravated felonies, 
deportation is perpetual exile.311 Judge Learned Hand noted in one 
deportation case, 
[W]e think it not improper to say that deportation under the 
circumstances would be deplorable. Whether the relator 
came here in arms or at the age of ten, he is as much our 
product as though his mother had borne him on American 
soil. He knows no other language, no other people, no other 
habits, than ours; he will be as much a stranger in Poland as 
anyone born of ancestors who immigrated in the seven-
teenth century. However heinous his crimes, deportation is 
to him exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the 
common consent of all civilized peoples.312 
Under current immigration law, U.S. lawful permanent residents 
convicted of minor crimes may be driven from the only home they 
know-leaving their families, careers, and friends behind.313 Moreo-
ver, this is not a temporary situation-once deported, a convicted ag-
gravated felon can never return to the United States.314 These laws are 
not only cruel, but also wildly inconsistent, meting out the same pun-
808 See Beharry, 183 F. Supp. 2d. at 604-05. 
809 See generally Alvarez-Garcia v. INS 234 F. Supp.2d 283 (S.D.N.Y 2002); Gonzalez-
Polanco v. INS, 2002 WL 1796834, at *8 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 5, 2002). 
810 Guerra & Guerra v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2471, at *7 n.4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 
15,2002). 
m See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (A)(ii) (2000). 
m U.S. ex rei. K10nis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630 (N.Y 1926). 
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ishment to lawful permanent residents who commit a misdemeanor 
offense as they do to undocumented non-citizens who enter the coun-
try to commit a terrorist act. 315 
The European Court of Human Rights, a highly esteemed and 
knowledgeable tribunal, condemns as a human rights violation such 
arbitrary interference in an individual's private and family life.316 In 
the past, United States immigration law did respect a person's ties to 
this country and waived deportation when those bonds were strong.317 
In 1996, however, that changed, as seemingly misplaced fear and dis-
trust of non-citizens escalated.318 
Judge Weinstein's reasoning in Beharry v. Reno attempts to rem-
edy this violation by complying with international law.319 This ap-
proach, however, is limited because it rests on the ambiguity of a par-
ticular provision of the INA.320 When the proper interpretation of the 
statute is clear and unambiguous, courts may simply find it impossible 
to construe the statute in compliance with international law. 321 There-
fore, to assure conformity with the fundamental right to respect for 
private and family life and cease this arbitrary banishment, the INA 
should be amended to include a balancing test that weighs the rele-
vant interests of the non-citizen and the government.322 Congress 
could meet this need by re-instituting aggravated felons' (~ligibility to 
apply for waivers of deportation and by providing for judicial review 
of waiver decisions, which would allow judges to apply a balancing test 
like that applied by the European court.323 
This equitable change would duly recognize a fundamental hu-
man right, as well as provide for much needed harmonization of do-
mestic and international law. 324 At present, when immigration reforms 
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based on fear and racia1 intolerance are an integral part of the politi-
ca1 agenda, lawmakers and the citizens they represent should be espe-
cially aware of three things. First, when immigration laws are passed in 
the wake of terror and anti-immigrant sentiment, lawful permanent 
residents are likely to suffer the same fate as the terrorists. Second, 
the United States has a duty-both legally and morally-to comply 
with international human rights norms, rather than bend to reaction-
ary political pressures. And finally, lawmakers must realize that Xuan 
Wilson, AI Correa, Emma Mendez De Hay, and Cesar Chamorro are 
Americans, even though their passports may say otherwise. What 
makes an American is not contained within a document, but depends 
upon an individual's relationship to this country-the very relation-
ship that is ignored in the face of increasingly draconian immigration 
laws. 

